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Abstract
This report inrvestigates the issues of securing access to computin,g resources i n computation.al grids. Grid en,viron,men.ts are built orb top of platforms that corrtrol access to
resources within a sin,gle adenin.istrative domairr, at the g.r-an,ular.ityof a use,r. In wide-area

multi-domain. grid en.viron,men.ts, the overhead of mainiainin,g user accounts is prohibitive,
a.rad secu7.in,g access to resources via user accountability is impractical. Typically, these issues are han,dled by inlplenlert,ting checks that guaran,tee the safety of applic~ations,so [hat
they can rurt. i n shared

use^

accour1.t~.This work shows that safety checks - lan,guage-based,

compile-time, link-time, load-lime

-

curren.tly implemen.ted in most grid en.virorrmen.ts are

either in,adequute or limit allowed grid users and applicatiorrs. Techn.ique.s without such
li7nitations are presen.ted. Shadow accoun,ts allow reu.se of user accounts without administrative overheads, and run-time solution~s- run-time 7non.itorirt.y and virtu.tr1 machines

-

allow arbilrary code to execute while erilforciny a given resource access policy.

Key Phrases: security in grid environments; safety of grid applications; access control of
shared resources; sharing user accounts; shadow accou~its;run-time application sandboxing;
virtual machines.

Introduction
Access t o computing resources has traditionally been coritrolled by assigning an "accou~it"
to each user. The process of assigning such i~seraccounts serves two purposes: 1) it helps
establish the accorintability of users - by obtziini~igpersonal and contact illformatior1 for
each user, for example; a ~ i d2) it allows administrators to enforce usage policies - by not
on certain machines, for example.
giving out accou~it~s
This approach has worked well within single administrative domains, but it has several
limitatioris t'hat present significant obstacles to tlie viability of computational grids, which
typically span multiple administrative domains. For example, creating accounts has an
administrative overhead, making it difficult to give users dynamic or temporary (in terms
of minutes or hours) access to resources. A~iotherproblem is that resource owners must
implicitly rely on the accountability of the users of the resources, making it difficult and
imprudent for them t o share resources outside of their administrative domains. Yet another
issue results from the inability of resource owners to control how tlie resource is utilized by
its users. For example, a resource owner may want some users to o~ilyuse certain rnachi~ies
for specified applicatiorls - but has no easy way to enforce this.
This i~ivestigationaddresses the security implications of making a complitirig resoiirce
available via computational grids. Both grid applications and shared resources must be
secured from rnalicio~lsactions of each other. This work focuses

011 the

issue of protecting

the shared resources from arbitrary code. It highlights the problems arid limitations of
current grid environments, and proposes solutions that are more robust, scalable, a ~ i d
secure.
The rest of the report is orga.11izedas follows. Sertiorl 2 describes t,he context for this work,

the PUNCH network computing environment. Section 3 olitli~~es
some of the lirnitatio~is
of the current approaches to sharing computing resources across admiriistrative domains.
Section 4 proposes new sohitions that can be used to overcome these limitations. Finally,
Section 5 presents concluding remaxks.

Background
This work was conducted in the context of PUNCH, the Purdue University Network Computing Hubs [9]. PUNCH is platform for grid computing that allows users to access
and run unmodified applications or1 distributed resources via standard Web browsers (see
ww~.~uncli.~urdue.edu
PUNCH
).
currently provides computing services t:o about 2,000
studerits arid researchers across two doze11 countries. More than 70 applications from different research institutions and vendors are available.
Operating a computing portal with a world-wide user base prese~itssome rather interesting issues. For example, PUNCH provides access to several commercial tools; access to
these tools must be restricted to Purdue students due to licensing constraints. Applications
range from batch (e.g., CacheSim5 - a cache simulator) to interactive (e.g., DLX-View a pipeli~iesimulator) to development environments (e.g., the SimpleScalar set of tools for
computer architecture simulation). Users are transient - students tend t o use PUNCH
a semester (or quarter) a.t a time, and researchers utilize the system for specific projects.
Usage policies associated with machines are complex and often change - for example,
many machines are o~ilyavailable for specific types of applications (e.g., ones that tend to
run quickly), and non-Purdue users typically can o~ilyuse them when they are not heavily
loaded.
The diversity of PUNCH users and applicatio~ishas significant value

i11

terms of vali-

dating research concepts. However, operatirig and supporting s l ~ d ai service in a research
enviroriment is impractical 11nless the administrative costs can he kept under co~itrol.This
work highlights the mecha~iismsi11 PUNCH that make it possible to streamline a ~ i dautomate marly of the tasks associated with graritirig users a.ccess to computi~igsystems without

violating usage policies or compromising on security.

PUNCH users can request user accou~its,these are logical accounts decoupled from machine accourits (Section 4.1), via its portal interface. These requests are processed automatically, arid users are given access according to a default policy. Users that request additional
privileges (e.g., Purdue students wanting access to commercial tools) are granted access after manual verification by an administrator. Changes are automatically propagated when
machines are added or removed, or when usage policies change.

3.

Securing Access to Grid

Resources from Malicious Use
From a security standpoint, the domain of trust - the set of entities that are trusted or
accountable - must lie with either the users, the applicatio~ls,or the grid middleware
(or some combi~iatio~i
of the three). In dynamic, wide-area comp~itingenviro~ime~lts,
it
is generally impractical to expect that all users can be held accou~itablefor their actions.
Plus, accountability does not prevent damage from being do~ie,making this a costly s c ~
lution. Another option is to trust tlie applicatio~is.This is typically acconiplished either
by co~istrainingthe development environment to a point where the generated applications
are guaranteed to be safe, or by making sure that the applications come from a trusted
source. However, limiting the functionality of applications also limits tlie usefiilness of the
computing environment, and history has shown that it is possible for applications from
trusted sources to corlt ain bugs (www.bugnet .corn) that compromise their integrity.
Conseque~itly,security is best achieved by active enforcement of policies within the grid
middleware layers. The following discussion surveys the different approaches utilized within
and describes their limitations; the subsequent section describes
current grid e~iviro~lments
that overcome some of the limitations of the current approaches.
new sol~~tions

3.1. User-based domain of trust
111systems that rely on end-user accountability, the principal [16] - the entity responsible
for actions of a process - is the user accolirit identifier. The process of obtai~iiriguser
accounts is independent of the actual grid middleware, arid is typically defi~iedby the

owners of the computirlg resources. Examples in t.his category include Globus [dl, Sun Grid
E,rigine [17], and PBS [ 2 ] .
This approach is not scalable as the administrative overhead of creatior~/rnaintenarlce,
due to (a) the large number of account,^ and (b) transient users requiring the account for
short periods of time, may be inhibiting. Moreover, if a user cannot be made accountable,
she/he cannot be given an account. This limits the potential users of the grid resources.
The grid process has access to all the resources of a st.andard TJNIX user; as a consequence, if the grid user account is compromised, all other systems in the Grid on which
that user has accounts are opened up for misuse. This makes proper implemerltatiori of
standard Unix securit,y or1 all the systems urlderlyirig the Grid more crucial.
In order to overcome the overhead of creat,ing individual accounts, some systems rely
011

sharing accounts among grid users. Examples include E~itropia(www.e~itropia.com),

Distributed.Net (www.distributed.net,)and United Devices (www.ud.com), where resource
owners dowrlload grid applications and run them in their accourits. There are two problems
with this approach. Firstly, though the grid processes may belong to different grid users,
as far as the TJNIX system is concerned they belong to the same user. So a grid process can
misbehave and affect the ot'her processes in the same accourit, for e.g., a malicious process
can terminate other processes owned by the user (using 'kill -9 -1'). Secondly, since the
shared accourit is a standard account (even user "~iobody"[ l l ] is a standard user t'hough
without a file system), it has access to local resources, axid can exploit them at least to
the extent allowed by the underlying UNIX access model. 111 addition, the grid user can
misuse resources, for example, to launch distributed denial-of-service attacks.

3.2. Application-based domain of trust
Orie way of working around the need for end-user account,ability is to er~surethat applications executed in grid environments are "safe". This "safety" can be achieved in one of two
ways: by coristrai~lingthe application development environment, or by trusting the source
of the application. Systems that rely on an application-based domain of trust typically run
,jobs from all users i11 a, single, shared account. Examples in this category that, constrain the

Point of trust

Examples

Restrictions

Issues

Entire

Entropia,

Safc APIs;

High overhead of adapting

plication

Distributed.net,

Requires application

application to grid;

generation

SETI@Home

source;

Unmodified binaries not

Trusted programmer,

supported

ap-

process

compiler, linker;
Human intervention

Compile-time

Static compiler analysis;

Analysis currently

Exponential binary code

proof carrying code

possible only for restricted

bloat (PCC);

(PCC) - proof synthesis

subsets of languages;

Ovcrheatl of analysis may

For PCC gcneral

not be justified;

verification is

Application can be

un-decidable

tampered with at a later
stage;
Unmodified binaries not
supported

Link-t ime

Condor;

Limited functionality;

Application can be

System-call wrapper

KO dynamic linking

tampered with at a later
stage;

approaches

Unmodified binaries not
supported

Load-time

Static analysis of machine

Works only for restricted

Overhead of analysis may

code;

subsets of languages

not be justified;

PCC - proof verification

May not protect against
self-modification or
stacklheap execution

Table 3.1. Examples of systems that rely on application-baseddomain of trust, and the corresponding restrictions and limitations.

/ * This program l o a d s t h e m a l i c i o u s
code i n t o t h e heap and t h e n e x e c u t e s
t h e code * /

f r e a d ( c o d e B u f f e r , 1, f i l e s i z e , f d ) ;

f = (codeBuffer); /*Casting t o func*/
f ( 5 );
/*Executing code*/

1 I

/ * Assembly code t o e x e c u t e
n number of f o r k s each
running an i n f i n i t e l o c p * /
looped0 (
-asm- ( "
push
%ebp
mov
% e s p ,%ebp
54:
mov
decl
test
j9
j mp
Jl:
mov
int
mov
test
j ne
56:
jmp
52:
leave
ret
"1 ;

Grid Application

Malicious code

Figure 3.1. Sample grid application code that can invoke malicious code at run time. The
malicious code bypasses the system call library and invokes fork() and exec() via the kernel.

application development environment include Condor [I I], safe languages such as Java [6],
and proof-carrying codes [12]. Examples of systems that rely on third-party trust (for the
safety of applications) include Entropia, Distributed.net and United Devices.
There are several problems with these approaches (see Table 1). Entities such as Entropia protect computing resources by carefully controlling the entire process of building
applications. This method, while feasible, is clearly experisive and time-co~isuming- partic~llarlyfor large, complex a,pplications. The use of safe languages such as Java can make
this approach less complicated, but t,liis excludes t,he use of unmodified binaries. Compiletime or link-time tests that at,t,empt t,o verify the safety of applications are also possible
(e.g., as with Condor), but such tests can be defeated.
In general, if users are allowed to modify code in a11y way (i.e., at the source, object,, or
binary levels), it is relatively simple for them to introduce trojan processes i11 the shared
account -without being detected by any compile- or link-time tests. Consider the following
example (see Figure 3.1). The grid application s1iow11 in the left half of the figure reads

a file into heap memory as a string. The string (in this case) contains machine code that
invokes a fork() and exec().

Now, the grid application sets a pointer to the starting

address of the string and executes it as a function (see the left half of the figure). This is
possible because the stack and data segments in Unix are executable.'
These types of "attacks" are very difficult t o detect at compile or link time. Even if one
could detect and disallow explicit casting of function pointers, other approaches exist : for
example, one could simply modify the executable (ma~iually)after it has been compiled or
import the malicious code into the execution stream at run-time. Also, it is not necessary
t o rely on the executable nature of the stack and data segments [IS].

3.3. Discussion
As shown in Figure 3.2, grid environments can be classified

011

the basis of their domain

of trust. Towards the left bottom of the figure are the ideal grid environments: they allow
untrusted users t o develop and execute arbitrary applications, while enforcing usage arid
security policies.
transThe X-axis represents the domain of trust. On the left, the run-time e~iviro~iment
parently handles trust issues; as one moves to the right, the domain of trust moves t o
the application, the application generation process, a11d finally to the end user. Observe
that, in general, as one moves t o the right, administrative and/or customization overheads
associated with defining and enforcing security increase. The Y-axis represents the cost of
building a grid application. At the bottom, the cost is negligible - grid environments in
this space transparentl y support urimodified binaries. At the other extreme, grid environments require custom-designed applications for security.
To better understand the classification scheme, consider the following examples with
respect to their positions in the figure. Systems such as Condor lie at the center of the
figure

-

they only require applications to be relinked with special-purpose libraries.

011

the other hand, with languages such as Java, one would have to rewrite the application
'This is a fundarncntal charactcristic of LTnix and cannot be disabled without other side effects that
limit functionality.

Entropia, dislributed.nel, SETI@Home etc.

I

Run-time
Environment

Application i Static Linking Compiling
Source Code End Usen
executables & Application generation Process 4

Domain of Trust

Figure 3.2. Classification of Grid Environments

completely

-

thus putting such approaches in the top right part of the figure. Fi~ially,

systems such as Glob~isand PBS require pote~itialusers t o establish accountability directly
with the system administrators, but allow them to rilri unmodified binaries - thus placing
them in the right part of the classificatio~ispace.
Observe that the region between the domain of trust and the run-time environment,
along the X-axis, presents opportunities for intrusion, if security is not actively enforced at
run-time. For example, in the case of Condor, link-time checks collld be bypassed after the
linking process is complete, but before the executable is submitted t o Condor. Systems sudi
as Entropia work around this problem by having a large domain of trust (by controlling
applicatio~lge11era.tion through execution). However, this is a manual and time-consuming
approach that sig~iificantlyincreases t,he overhead (and cost,) of building grid applicatio~is.
The following section describes solutions based on a combi~~ation
of private, anonymous

accolints and either 1) run-time monitoring or 2) virtual machines. Sutli soh~t,ionslie
towards the bottom left of the cla.ssification space (see figure) and can facilitate secure
sharing of computing resources without compromisi~lgsecurity.

4.

Securing Access to Grid

Resources

-

The PUNCH Approach

111 this section, we present techniques t o overcome the grid security shortconlings p r e s e ~ ~ t e d
i11 Section 3. Section 4.1 describes the method used in PUNCH to overcome the administrative overhead of maintaining user account,^ on grid resources. Sections 4.2 and 4.3 describe
two approaches, currently being evaluated in PTJNCH, to guarantee safe grid applications
the absence of user-accountability. The domain of trust

i11

both these approaches

-

i11

based

on process monitoring and virtual maclii~ies- is in the ru11-time e~ivironmentprovided by
the grid middleware.

4.1. Private, anonymous accounts
A standard user account provides the followi~igfunctions: (a) allows data storage,
(b) maintains privacy of data, (c) co~lt,rolsaccess t o computing resources, a,nd (d) ensures
accountability. On standard systems a user account is associated with a unique numeric
identifier (e.g. TJNIX uid), which is permanentl y assigned t o the user. Creating individual
user accou~itson all machines, has administ'rative overheads, because a p e r m a ~ l e ~idenit
tifier must be created at the host system level, for every user - temporary or permanent.
However, the functions provided by the user accou~ltneed not be tied to the unique identifier all the time, provided a separate mecllanism is available to eIislire data identity and
privacy. PUNCH m a i ~ l t a i ~grid
l s user data in logical riser accounts [8] whidl are not tied
t o specific numeric identifiers. It also maintains a set of physical user acr:ounts referred
t o as "shadow accounts". PTJNCH treats the numeric identifiers of these shadow accou~its

as intercharigeable entities that can be recycled among grid users on demand. Herice, the
logical accourits serve ns capabilities to L'checkout" shadow accounts or1 t,he appropriate
resources.
There are two advantages to this approach.
Recycling a small ni~mberof shadow accourits among the grid users removes the
problems associated with creation/maintenance of physical user accounts on the host
machines in the grid.
Sirice the physical a,ccounts on the hosts are time multiplexed among the grid users,
there is no need for grid processes belonging to different users to share accolints thus implicitl y providing protectiori between grid processes of different users on a
host.
PUNCH has employed shadow accounts since early 1998.

4.2. Run-time Process Monitoring
Arbitrary applications can be saridboxed at execution time, to enforce host security policies [ I , 7, 51, by monitoring the system call trace of the programs and selectively permitting
or denying access to resources as specified by a policy file. This is enabled by process tracing
capabilities, tlie p t r a c e 0 system-call arid the / p r o c file-system, in modern U N l X systems.
Using p t r a c e 0 , a parent process can monitor its child process, intercept system-calls, arid
use the /proc interface t o modify the child's run-time environment, and thereby grant or
deny access to resources at a very fine grariularity. Run-time monitoring along with shadow
accoi~ritsdescribed in Section 4.1 provides a security solution that is close to the ideal grid
in Figure 3.2.
When the entire applicat,ion is monitored, the cost of shifting back and forth between
kernel and user mode atleast twice and the context switches between the applicatio~larid tlie
monitoring process for eacli intercepted system call can be significant. Hybrid approaches
tliat use static analyses of source code at compile t.ime or of machine code i ~ load
t
time, to
determine iirlsafe portioris of code and limit mo~iitoririgto these portions, can redlice tlie
overliead of rilri-time mo~iitori~ig.

Wlie~ithe applicatio~isource is available, the compiler can perform static arialyses of
ted
and find portions of code that can~iotbe guaranteed to be safe
tlie ~ l ~ i t r ~ i s program
(e.g., pointer casting, memory de-referencing, etc.). 01ily these unsafe portions of code
need to be monitored at run-time, for example using the shadow processing approach [13].
With this approach, program-slicing techniques are used to generate a customized program
by deleting comp~itationsnot relevant to the monitoring. The original application is run
i11

lock-step with the customized program, the shadow process. Run-time monitoring is

applied only to tlie shadow process, and if it fails any check, the original application is
terminated. Overhead from the shadow processing can be hidden, by using idle processors
in m~iltiprocessorworkstations. This approach can also be used with unmodilied machine
i g static analyses presented i11 [21].
code, ~ i s i ~ tlie
This approach of ruri-time monitoring in shadow-accou~ltsis being tested internally in
PUNCH. Run-time monitoring [I] has also bee11 employed on PUNCH as an e~iabli~ig
mechanism for the implementation of a virtual file system [S].

4.3. Run-time Virtual Machines
The Java Virtual Machine (JVM) [lo] implements a security manager, which uses signature verificatio~land application sandboxing, to ensure that byte code froin a11 uritrusted
source cannot cause damage to the local resources of the host. There are security issues
with Java implementation as disc~lssedin [3], but even with these problems fixed, the Java
approach implies grid applications are restricted t o Java, and applicatio~lsdeveloped in
other languages must be ported to the Java platform. hloreover, current Java applications
rely on the Java Native Interface, written in languages like C, for local 1,IO etc, making
them suscept,ible to the types of attacks implied by Figure 3.1.

A virtual machine that is deco~ipledfrom applications can also be co~iceived.Examples
of application-independent virtual rnachi~lesfor UNIX-based systems i~icludeIRM's Virtual
Image Facility [15] and VMware 1191. These systems support sa~idboxingat the level of
operating systems: mult,jple copies of a "guest" O/S ( a commoIl case to both approaches
is 1,INUX) may ceexist at run-time, shari~iga machine's hardware tlirougli a "liost" O/S

(e.g. LINUX or VM/ESA).
Application-independent virtual machines provide a substrate for executing arbitrary
un-trusted code without compromisi~igthe host machine security. Furthermore, un-trusted
users can be supported in a secure manner via a single-user assignment to guest O/S
sessions. As long as the interface between the host and guest operating systems is secure,
untrusted users can execute arbitrary applications without compromising either t,he host
or any of the other guest operating systems (i.e. those belonging to other users).
~ i supporti~ig
t
u11-trusted users and
While virtual machines support a secure e ~ i v i r o ~ i m efor
applications, there are performance and portability issues that hinder their application to
existing systems. Today's virtual machi~iesare clistomized to specific hardware platforms
(e.g. TRhI S/390 and Intel x86) and incur run-time overheads for O/S requests. Specialized
support for virtual machines can mitigate run-time overheads, but may require hardware
assistance 11ot available in commodity processors (e.g. multiple levels of address tra~islatio~i
i11

the S/390 [20]).
Future work will investigate resource management mechanisms that will allow virtual

machines to be allocated efficiently 011-demand and user-transpare~itly,as computing units
for PTJNCH.

Conclusions
The issues with secliring access to shared resolirces i11 grid e~ivironme~its
are the result of
a mismatcli between the characteristics of grid users and traditional users of the computing resolirces that u~iderlythe grid. The access mechariisms of the underlying computing
platforms, which are at the granularity of a user, are thus not restrictive e~loughi11 grid e~iviroments. The limitations of tecll~iiquescurrently used to overcome this issut: are presented.
Solutions that can be implemented in the grid middleware are described

-

slladow accounts

t o overcome the administrative overhead of maintaining user accounts, and techniques that
secllre access to grid resources, sucli as run-time rno~iitoririgand virtual machines. C'
~iverl
the wide-scale deployment of grid environments, a long-term solution to the issues presented may involve modifying the underlying operating systems or1 computirig resource, to
support grid users, for e.g. a capability-based access model to resources.
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